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“Making the NABSW the villain of the story, making that group  
responsible for why black children were disproportionately in the 
child welfare system, misses that organization’s real and substantial 
contribution to this debate: it tried to call attention to the ways black 
single mothers are targeted by the child protection systems, and tried 
to defend those mothers”1. 
 
There are large numbers of ethnic minority children in state child care that 
are awaiting adoptive families. For many, these adoptive families never 
materialise. This is true in the United States as well as in England. Some 
argue that the solution is to promote transracial adoption—for white adoptive 
families to adopt ethnic minority children. The idea of transracial adoption is 
a highly emotive one, bringing together issues of race and adoption, both of 
which on their own can bring forth strong visceral reactions.2  
This article contrasts laws in the United States and England that govern 
transracial adoption of children from the state child care system. The purpose 
of the comparison in this article is not to identify the positive and negative 
aspects in each approach, nor yet to propose that one is advantageous or 
superior to the other.  A combination of Critical Race Theory and autopoetic 
theory is used to show that the intention of transracial adoption laws has 
never, in fact, been to reduce the number of waiting ethnic minority 
children—despite the rhetoric that sounds in favour of transracial placements. 
It is not, despite claims to the contrary, a child centred practice with the 
ultimate aim of benefitting children. In transracial adoption, the social 
expectation is about preserving racial hierarchies in society, not about 
                                                     
* Lecturer in Law at the University of Buckingham. This article is dedicated to the 
memory of my godmother, Becky Vaughan, a founding member of the National 
Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW).  
1 L Briggs “Somebody’s Children” (2009) Utah Law Review 422 at 454.  
2 See, for instance, R-A Howe “Redefining the Transracial Adoption Controversy” 
(1995) 2 Duke Journal of Gender, Law and Policy 131 at 131.  
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transcending them.3 Transracial adoption does not play a role in overcoming 
or changing existent social structures and hierarchies. It simply reinforces and 
replicates them. The use of Critical Race Theory and autopoietic theory will 
be used to show that transracial adoption is about satisfying the desires of 
prospective adoptive parents, and not about responding to the needs and 
interests of the large numbers of ethnic children in child care awaiting 
adoption.  
 
CRITICAL RACE THEORY AND AUTOPOIETIC THEORY  
 
Race and the place that race-consciousness should have in society, in the 
legal system, and in decisions regarding the adoption of children in state care, 
if at all,  is a contentious issue.4 It is a discussion that polarises—with 
opposing views emotionally and passionately presented and defended. Race 
and adoption are issues which can bring strong visceral reactions to the fore of 
analysis and debate—even in legal academic discussion. The emotive content 
is very much part and parcel of these topics. It must be acknowledged in any 
analysis of transracial adoption.  Because of this, any discussion on transracial 
adoption should identify its analytical standpoint for discussion, ontological 
and epistemological view from which transracial adoption is being discussed 
and considered. This article uses critical race theory and autopoiesis to 
consider the legal system and its discourse on transracial adoption.  
Of course to do so breaks with the usual way in which race and law are 
discussed—or perhaps more importantly not discussed. This is pointedly 
underscored by the work of Shani King, who observes the dearth of critical 
consideration of the links between race and law in most family law 
textbooks.5 The discussion never advances beyond whether or not transracial 
                                                     
3 T Perry “The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and 
Subordination” (1993) 21 Review of Law and Social Change 33 at 104 comments that 
“choosing across racial lines [for adoption] is reserved for whites” at 104, with the 
expectation asserted that “white parents can parent whatever child they choose” at 
107, that being ethnic minority infants. She further comments that “[t]ransracial 
adoption is a struggle over black babies...not the full range of Black children 
available.” at 86, emphasis added. See also P Quiroz “Color-blind Individualism, 
Intercountry Adoption Policy and Public Policy” (2007) 34 Journal of Sociology and 
Social Welfare 57 at 57, who states that “the real issue continues to be which children 
are desired by which parent.” 
4 Howe n 2 above at 131.  
5 S King “The Family Law Canon in a (Post?) Racial Era” (2011) 72(3) Ohio State 
Journal 575. 
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adoption serves the best interests of the child.6 But that is not the only 
shortcoming regarding the way in which race and family law is discussed:  
 
“Instead of engaging in a thorough discussion of the impact of the 
child welfare system’s impact on African-American families, family 
law casebooks focus on foster care in the context of adoption—such 
as the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA)—and frame racial issues 
around the pros and cons of interracial adoption...In short, the family 
law casebooks are part of the family law canon that fails to accurately 
and adequately describe the relationship between family law and 
race.”7 
 
The very important consideration of how ethnic minority children enter 
and remain in state care systems in disproportionate percentages does not 
factor into these texts. Instead transracial adoption is presented as a cure to a 
situation whose root causes have not been adequately explored. The fallacy of 
simply accepting transracial adoption as a cure without further exploration of 
the underlying dynamics and causes is aptly described by Ruth-Arlene Howe:  
 
“...it was very simplistic and unethical to assume that the best way to 
meet the physical, social and emotional needs of Black foster children 
was by eliminating the practice of “same-race” placements and 
promoting transracial adoption (TRA). It’s like building a hospital at 
the bottom of a cliff to treat victims of car crashes, instead of posting 
speed warnings and erecting a fence or other guardrail at the top to 
prevent cars from plunging down the cliff side.”8 
 
Despite the silence that is maintained about discussions on race and the 
law in the family law canon, there are other growing areas of legal scholarship 
that focus on not only this relationship but on the silence on it that has been 
maintained in much of legal discourse. Critical race theory has added a 
valuable perspective to discussions on race and the law.9 It is an approach to 
discussing, analysing and theorising about the relationship between race and 
law that arose from post-civil rights society to ‘understand and come to grips 
with the more subtle, but just as deeply entrenched, varieties of racism that 
                                                     
6 Ibid at 615-616. 
7 Ibid. 
8 R-A Howe “Race Matters In Adoption” (2008) 42(3) Family Law Quarterly 465 at 
468.  
9 See generally “Introduction” in R Delgado and J Stefancic (eds) Critical Race 
Theory: The Cutting Edge (Temple University Press, 2nd edn, 2000).  
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characterize our time’.10 But Critical Race Theory brings more to analysis 
than a textured approach to dealing with issues of race and racial 
subordination. It is an approach that sees much inadequacy in the status quo 
and long prevailing approaches in dealing with these issues:  
 
“Virtually all of Critical Race Theory is marked by deep discontent 
with liberalism, a system of civil rights litigation and activism 
characterized by incrementalism, faith in the legal system and hope 
for progress, among other things.”11 
 
Although it might be presumed that racism ceased to be a social issue 
after the Civil Rights movement of the 1960’s Critical Race Theory 
proponents argue that racism remains, as much as ever, albeit in a different 
form.12 While it might not be as overt as it was prior to the Civil Rights 
movement, more covert forms remain.13 As well, Critical Race scholars 
contend that there has been a backlash to the Civil Rights movement which is 
reflected in laws which have become more punitive towards African –
Americans in an attempt to restore the social power balance that was upset by 
the Civil Rights movement.14 
In its departure from liberalism, Critical Race Theory charts a much 
different approach for legal scholarship as well as the way in which issues of 
race and society are considered. Several defining tenets of Critical Race 
Theory are important for understanding the content of this approach. Firstly is 
the view that it takes towards the prevalence and persistence of racism in 
society:  
 
“....racism is normal, not aberrant, in American society. Because 
racism is an ingrained feature of our landscape, it looks ordinary and 
natural to persons in the culture.”15 
 
Another important precept is the role that legal scholarship has to play. 
Legal scholarship is not detached and divorced from the realities it examines. 
Rather, there is an active part that legal scholarship can play in addressing 
racial inequities in society:  
 
                                                     
10 Ibid at xvi. 
11 R Delgado “Critique of Liberalism” in Critical Race Theory above n 9, p 1.   
12 See discussion below.  
13 See discussion below. 
14 See discussion below.  
15 Introduction n 9 above p xvi.  
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“...we need not acquiesce in arrangements that are unfair and one-
sided. By writing and speaking against them, we may hope to 
contribute to a better, fairer world.”16 
 
Another important component of Critical Race Theory is that of ‘interest 
convergence’:17  
 
“this concept holds that white elites will tolerate or encourage racial 
advances for blacks only when such advances also promote white self-
interest. Other Criticalists question whether civil rights law is 
designed to benefit folks of color, and even suggest that it is a 
homeostatic mechanism that ensures that racial progress occurs at just 
the right pace: Change that is too rapid would be unsettling to society 
at large; that which is too slow could prove destabilizing.”18 
 
Discussions of race, privilege and the social construction of these within 
and as part of the law may be very uncomfortable topics. The critical race 
perspective challenges the long-dominant positivist law and liberal doctrines 
that kept a silence over these very issues. In short, critical race theory 
provides a theoretical basis for examining questions on race and the law. 
Autopoiesis theory is another necessary correlate in the process of trying to 
understand the legal discourse on transracial adoption in the United States and 
England. Seen through the lens of autopoietic theory, law is a system of 
communication.19 As a system of communication, law interacts with and 
interprets the communications it receives from other systems.20 But for those 
communications to make sense to law, they are reinterpreted within the legal 
system.21 
                                                     
16 Ibid p xvii.  
17 Ibid  p  xvii. 
18 Ibid  p xvii. 
19 M King “The “Truth”About Autopoiesis” (1993) 20(2) Journal of Law and Society 
218, at 219 explains that “Autopoiesis is, then, a theoretical approach to the 
operations of social systems and their relationships with each other and with the 
general social environment.” See also M King “Children”s Rights as Communication: 
Reflections on Autopoietic Theory and the United Nations Convention” (1994) 57 
Modern Law Review 385, 385.  
20 See generally C Smith “Autopoietic Law and the ‘Epistemic Trap’: A Case Study 
of Adoption and Contact” (2004) 31 Journal of Law and Society 318; M King (1994)  
n 20 above; M King  ( 1993) n 20 above at 218;  M King “Child Welfare within Law: 
The Emergence of a Hybrid Discourse” (1991) 18(3) Journal of Law and Society 303.  
21  M King (1991) n 20 above at 308-315.   
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Critical race theory scholars have offered a similar perspective as 
autopoietic scholars as to the role that the law plays in maintaining a social 
status quo in line with societal expectations. Whilst Critical Race Theory does 
much to uncover the concealment of racial issues within legal discourse, the 
use of autopoietic theory provides further analytical insight into the legal 
system communication on transracial adoption.  
Schiff and Nobles give a concise explanation of the relationship 
commonalities and differences between critical legal studies (of which critical 
race theory is an outgrowth) 22 and autopoiesis theory: 
 
“Autopoiesis and... CLS...share a common starting point in their 
respective acceptance of law’s indeterminacy, in the sense that the 
outcomes of legal decisions are not dictated, but involve choice ( they 
could have been other than what they were). But autopoiesis and CLS 
adopt a radically different approach to the conclusions to be drawn 
from this. For CLS law is politics, and attempts to establish any 
essential differences between the nature of political and legal 
decisions need to be unmasked and discredited. By contrast, for 
autopoiesis, law is not politics, just as it is not economics, or media or 
general social communication; politics are part of law’s environment 
which environment it constructs for itself...”23 
 
Critical race theory and  autopoietic theory share the perspective that law 
as a system is a reinforcement of social status quo—and not an agent of 
change—which is expressed in critical race theory as ‘interest convergence’. 
24 Autopoetic theory shares the view that the legal system does not act as a site 
of change, but that any change in the legal system merely is reflective of 
change in society and social expectations: 
 
“For autopoiesis, the indeterminacy of all systems ( not just law), and 
the nature of their respective autonomies....leads to a much reduced 
role for the kind of choices that could be ascribed as a conscious 
attempt to develop law or other aspects of society in any direction.”25 
 
                                                     
22 A Harris “Foreword: The Jurisprudence of Reconstruction” (1994) 82 California 
Law Review 741 at 741, 743, 745-754; D Bell “Who”s Afraid of Critical Race 
Theory?”(1995) University of Illinois Law Review 893 at 898-901. 
23 R Nobles and D Schiff A Sociology of Jurisprudence (Hart Publishing 2006) Law’s 
Politics: Criticising Critical Legal Studies p 164.  
24 See discussion infra.  
25 Schiff and Nobles n 23 above at 164-166.  Emphasis added.  
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The legal system has a very simple way of interpreting messages and 
content from other systems.  Autopoiesis theory explains that law interprets 
things in a binary manner26—classifying them as either ‘lawful27’ or 
‘unlawful’.28 Critical race theory again informs this discussion. Harris 
explains that the United States still uses the system of racial classification that 
was the result of a ‘justification for slavery.’29 The United States had 
developed a bifurcated classification where a person was either white or not 
white.30 This bifurcated way of understanding a person’s race fits neatly into 
the sort of coding that autopoietic theory accords to how systems classify and 
understand information. It is why such binary splits are so attractive, prevalent 
and persistent in legal systems.  
The legal system understands and operates in this simple language of 
bifurcated coding, and it is from this language and coding that racial relations 
have been managed both socially and legally inside the United States. This 
observation regarding autopoietic view of the legal system is an important 
one, particularly when addressing a legal issue as infused with visceral 
emotion and social expectation as that of transracial adoption. Legal systems 
cannot be consciously manipulated to push society in one direction or another. 
Legal systems  responds to communications—but do not  respond to a 
conscious choice in such a forthright matter. Law delivers what society 
expects. If the inequity of society is mirrored in the law, a change in the law 
does not change the inequities of society.31  
In so doing however, ‘the law masked the ideological content of race 
discrimination and the exercise of power required to maintain it.’32 And whilst 
there might be claims that law no longer operates in this way, Harris responds 
to these claims:  
 
                                                     
26  M King (1993)  n 19 above at 223. 
27 Ibid at 223.  
28 Ibid at 223.  
29 C Harris, “Whiteness as Property” in ( K Crenshaw, N Gotanda, G Peller, and K 
Thomas eds) Critical Race Theory: The Key Writings that Formed the Movement 
((1995) (The New Press New York) p 278.  
30 Ibid p 283-284. 
31 Schiff and Nobles n 23 above at 171.  Schiff and Nobles  n 23 above further explain 
that “While autopoiesis accepts that the law constitutes and reinforces inequalities of 
access found in the economic system, political system, media etc, these inequalities 
are produced separately within each system” at 171.  
32 Harris n 29 above at 284.  
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“Although the substance of race definitions has changed, what persists 
is the expectation of white-controlled institutions in the continued 
right to determine meaning—the reified privilege of power...”33 
 
This again is something that is a shared view between critical legal studies 
and autopoiesis theory. Schiff and Nobles explain:  
 
“Autopoiesis and CLS both acknowledge that disparities in power 
affect the ability of parties to make legal communications ( namely 
differentiated access to law) but neither simply equates law with 
power ( legal right is not the same thing as wealth or the ability to 
coerce physically). And the claim that law, like politics, is composed 
of decisions that represent choices between competing values does not 
mean that these choices are equally open to each and every 
individual.”34 
 
Legal change will not result in societal change—rather   societal change 
and changes in societal expectation result in legal system communication 
changes. This may be a controversial and even contestable position for 
proponents of white adoptive parent adoption of black children transracial 
adoption. This is to be expected as this message about the law removes the 
mask—it demonstrates the way in which legal discourse perpetuates the 
inequities in society—as well as the fact that there are such inequities.  
 
COLOUR-BLIND AND COLOUR-CONSCIOUS   
  
Race is a socially constructed category.35 Any discussion about ethnicity 
or race must first grapple with this idea. The prospect of comparing adoption 
laws in their approach to race might be seen as being made all more complex 
because of the differences in social construction of race. As a social 
construction ‘referents of terms like Black and White are social groups, not 
genetically distinct branches of human kind.’36 
The idea of race is simply a reflection of social mores and customs of a 
given time and place, no more than that.  Differing classifications of race—
indeed the notion of race itself-- serves a purpose; it is ‘a means of creating 
                                                     
33 Ibid at 287.  
34 Schiff and Nobles n 23 above  p 167.  
35 See generally A Smedley and B Smedley “Race as Biology is Fiction, Race as a 
Social Problem is Real: Anthropological and Historical Perspectives on the Social 
Construction on Race” (2005) 60(1) American Psychologist 16. 
36 I Haney Lopez “The Social Construction of Race” in Critical Race Theory n 9 
above, p 165.  
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and enforcing social order, a lens through which differential opportunity and 
inequality are structured.’37 Congruent with the way in which the legal system 
functions, classifications of race are created to maintain a particular status 
quo, and act as a mirror on social expectations on the way that the social 
order, privilege and hierarchy should be maintained. 
A colour-blind approach is one that literally does not ‘see’ colour in the 
law.  As discussed below, this is the position that has been taken in the United 
States federal law that deals with adoption from state child care. It is the place 
that English adoption policy seems to be moving. Proponents of a colour blind 
approach to the law present it as a desirable one that acts to provide racial 
equality in society:  
 
“Advocates of the color-blind model argue that non recognition by 
government is clearly superior to any race-conscious process. Indeed, 
nonrecognition advocates apparently find the political and moral 
superiority of this technique so self-evident that they think little or no 
justification is necessary.”38 
 
Critics of the colour-blind approach –those who call for race-
consciousness in law argue that a colour-blind approach is in fact not neutral 
and acts as a mask to cover over racial inequities in society:  
 
“..the attempt to deny racial consideration, is, at its root, an attempt to 
hide the underlying racial oppression, a reality no amount of hand-
waving and obfuscation can eliminate.”39 
 
TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION LAW, POLICY AND GUIDANCE 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND  
 
A February 2011 change in English adoption policy is heralded as ending 
a ban on transracial adoption placements.40 But despite the widespread 
perceptions, there has never been an outright legal ban on such placements 
being made. English adoption law, through the Adoption and Child Act 2002, 
requires that a child’s ethnicity be taken into account when adoption 
                                                     
37 A Smedly and B Smedly  n 35 above at 24.  
38 N Gotanda “A Critique of “Our Constitution  is Color-Blind” in Critical Race 
Theory n 9 above at 35.   
39 Ibid at 37.  
40 See for instance, “Ministers Tell Social Workers Not to Bar Interracial Adoption” 
February 19, 2011, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/feb/19/uk-
interracial-adoption-social-workers-guidance. 
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placement decisions are being made.41  But transracial placements were never 
forbidden. It was thought that social worker reluctance to make transracial 
placements resulted in a growing number of ethnic minority children awaiting 
a match with adoptive parents—parents deemed suitable on grounds of an 
ethnic match—with available transracial placements bypassed to wait for an 
appropriate ethnic match to turn up. Thus, the policy change was announced 
to underscore that there was no legal ban on transracial adoptions.  
The new announcement raises several questions about the perceptions that 
there was a ban on transracial adoption and the response to it. Given that 
English adoption law and policy have never banned transracial adoption, why 
was the choice made to address this with a policy change? What do both the 
perception of a ban and the choice of response say about the social 
expectations in English society? A policy change was not the inevitable 
choice to try to address the status on the law. Other apparent choices include 
education on the law. What then is significant about the choice of a policy 
statement? Is there a subtle or not so subtle shift towards a colour-blind 
system and away from a colour-conscious one? This seems evident given the 
change in statutory guidance language—discussed below.42 If there is a shift 
away from a colour-conscious system, what does this portend?  
The United States, in response to a perceived similar situation, passed a 
federal law in 1996.43 This law limited the circumstances under which an 
adoption placement decision could take account of the race, colour or national 
origin of the child or prospective adoptive parent when making adoption 
placements. These characteristics could be considered only in exceptional 
circumstances. Failure to comply with the federal law attracts heavy 
penalties—loss of federal funds for non-compliant agencies.44  
Yet the aggressive approach to promote transracial adoption has been 
singularly unsuccessful in many respects. There are large numbers of African-
American children who are legally freed for adoption and yet continue to wait 
for an adoptive match. Statistics on children in the American child care 
system show that there are 107,000 children awaiting adoption.45 Of these, 29 
                                                     
41 See discussion below.  
42 See discussion below.  
43 See discussion below. 
44 The United States Department of Health and Human Services levied monetary 
penalties for MEPA-IEP violations for the first time in 2003 and a second time in 
2005. Details of these actions can be found at: 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/civilrights/activities/examples/Adoption%20Foster%20Care/
adoption_case_summaries.html. 
45 In the complied statistics, children who do not yet have their parental rights 
terminated are included in this percentage as well as those children whose parent’s 
rights to them have been terminated, leaving them legally free for adoption.  It also 
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percent of the children are classified as black—in other words, approximately 
31,000. 46 The large numbers of black children who are awaiting adoption has 
not been substantially reduced despite the colour-blind approach mandated by 
American federal laws. There is a surfeit of statistical data on children in the 
American foster care system. A snapshot of data shows that in 2010, 12, 795 
African-American children were adopted from state care systems.47 This 
compares to 16, 554 in 200348, 13, 078 in 200749, 14, 211 in 2009.50   
According to the comprehensive review of MEPA-IEP by the Evan B 
Donaldson Foundation, MEPA-IEP has been a failure on a number of 
elements. The Evan B Donaldson report comments that ‘statistics belie the 
expectations that transracial adoption would significantly increase adoption 
opportunities for older Black children.’51 Moreover, as the report points out, 
sections of MEPA-IEP that require recruitment of black foster and adoptive 
families are poorly monitored—if at all—in contrast to the fierce penalties 
enacted if race, colour or national origin have been taken into effect when 
making placement decisions for a child. 52  
Clearly, a colour-blind approach has not solved the problem of large 
numbers of black children awaiting adoption. So, why is such an approach 
still used in the law?  Why is it not being challenged as having been 
ineffectual in significantly reducing the number of black children awaiting 
adoption?  And should the English legal drift towards a more colour-blind 
approach be of concern?   
Adoption laws in the United States are generally presented as being 
colour-blind.  This, however, is a misperception generated from the federal 
law that governs adoptions from federally funded adoption agencies and state 
                                                                                                                               
includes children who have been given a case plan goal of adoption, although the 
rights of their parents have not yet been terminated.  
46 Data from the  Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System 
(hereinafter “AFCARS”)  Administration for Families and Children, U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, shows 64,084 children had their parental rights 
terminated, with 107, 011 children who either had a goal of adoption or parental 
rights terminated. Data is from “Preliminary FY 2010 Estimates as of June 2011”, at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/tar/report_18.  
47 “Trends in Foster Care and Adoption—FY 2002-FY 2010” at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/trends_june2011.pdf (here-
inafter “Trends”) 
48Ibid.  
49Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Evan B Donaldson Foundation “Finding Families for African American Children: 
The Role of Race and Law in Adoption from Foster Care” (May 2008) at 34. See 
discussion at 33-34.  
52 Ibid at 35-36.  
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departments.53 It is this law—and only this one-- that limits consideration of 
race, colour and national origin of the child or prospective adoptive 
placement.  But this colour-blind approach has not always been present in 
domestic adoption laws. The United States adoption law status is somewhat 
confusing, given that there are multiple laws that cover adoption.  There are at 
least four different legal scenarios for adoption. The current federal law—the 
Multi-Ethnic Placement Act, as amended by the Inter-ethnic Placement Act 
(MEPA-IEP) -- that restricts the consideration of race, colour or national 
origin of the child or prospective adoptive placement to very limited 
circumstances applies only where the child is being placed through an 
adoption agency or state department that receives federal funding. In most 
situations, these agencies are ones that provide services for children who are 
in the state child care system.  
Secondly, adoptions of Native American children are governed by the 
federal Indian Child Welfare Act. Thirdly, independent adoptions—those 
done by agencies who do not receive federal funding—are governed by state 
laws. There can be a great deal of variance in state laws on specifics for 
adoption. Finally, intercountry adoption is governed by the Intercountry 
Adoption Act (IAA) and its implementing regulations, in force since April 1, 
2008.54 
Until a change made by the Inter-Ethnic Act in  1996, United States 
federal law permitted  taking into  account the race, colour or national origin 
of a child or prospective foster or adoptive placement where the child was 
being placed through an agency that received federal funding.  The original 
text of MEPA states:  
 
(1) Prohibition -- An agency, or entity, that receives Federal assistance 
and is involved in adoption or foster care placements may not--  
(A) categorically deny to any person the opportunity to become an 
adoptive or a foster parent, solely on the basis of the race, color, or 
national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, involved; 
or  
(B) delay or deny the placement of a child for adoption or into foster 
care, or otherwise discriminate in making a placement decision, solely 
on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or 
foster parent, or the child, involved.  
(2) Permissible consideration-- An agency or entity to which 
paragraph (1) applies may consider the cultural, ethnic, or racial 
background of the child and the capacity of the prospective foster or 
                                                     
53 The Multi-Ethnic Placement Act (1994) Public Law 103-382 as amended by the 
Inter-Ethnic Placement Act (1986) Public Law 104-88. 
54 Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, Public Law 106-279. 
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adoptive parents to meet the needs of a child of this background as 
one of a number of factors used to determine the best interests of a 
child. 55 
 
This approach, which is very similar in text to the English Adoption and 
Child Act 2002 provisions, did not forbid the consideration of culture, 
ethnicity or race. It allowed the consideration of these factors along with other 
factors to determine if a placement would be in the best interests of a child. 
The federal law had not yet become colour-blind. But in 1996, amendments to 
this act changed the entire landscape of child welfare decision making. The 
changes made by the Inter-ethnic Placement Act limited the consideration of 
race, colour or national origin to exceptional circumstances. Thus, the colour-
blind approach to adoption became part of the American federal law.  
The Inter-ethnic Act Placement provisions provide: 
 
“…not later than January 1, 1997, provides that neither the State nor 
any other entity in the State that receives funds from the Federal 
Government and is involved in adoption or foster care placements 
may--  
(A) deny to any person the opportunity to become an adoptive or a 
foster parent, on the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the 
person, or of the child, involved; or (B) delay or deny the placement 
of a child for adoption or into foster care, on the basis of the race, 
color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, 
involved..”56  
 
This seemingly benign language is not dissimilar on its face to the 
Adoption and Child Act 2002.  However, interpretations issued by the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services ( HHS)  made clear that any 
consideration of race, colour or national origin had to meet exceptional 
circumstances, and that the ability of parents to meet the cultural, ethnic or 
racial needs of the child was no longer to be part of decisions as to adoptive 
placements. A statement from 1998 issued by HHS underscored the impact of 
this new law:  
 
“Public agencies may not routinely consider race, national origin and 
ethnicity in making placement decisions. Any consideration of these 
factors must be done on an individualized basis where special 
circumstances indicate that their consideration is warranted. A practice 
                                                     
55 Multi-Ethnic Placement Act of 1994, Public Law 103-382. Sec. 553. 42 USC 
5115a. Emphasis added.  
56 Inter-ethnic Placement Act, Public Law 104-88.  
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of assessing all children for their needs in this area would be 
inconsistent with an approach of individually considering these factors 
only when specific circumstances indicate that it is warranted.”57 
 
This interpretation of the statutory language restricts consideration of race, 
colour and national origin to circumstances where it is seen as necessary after 
an individual assessment of the child indicates that these need to be taken into 
account. Further guidance explains the constitutional basis of the 
interpretation as well as giving further detail on the strict limitations of when 
it would be considered appropriate to give consideration these factors: 
 
“The Department's policy in this delicate area is guided by a number 
of complementary statutory provisions: 
 
From the perspective of civil rights law, the strict scrutiny standard 
under Title VI, the Interethnic Adoption provisions and the U.S. 
Constitution forbid decision making on the basis of race or ethnicity 
except in the very limited circumstances where such consideration 
would be necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest. 
The only compelling governmental interest related to child welfare 
that has been recognized by courts is protecting the "best interests" of 
the child who is to be placed. 
 
Additionally, the consideration must be narrowly tailored to advance 
the child's interests, and must be made as an individualized 
determination for each child.”58 
 
The 1996 prohibitions do not apply to children who meet the definitional 
requirements of being an ‘Indian child’59  under the 1978 Indian Child 
                                                     
57Answer to GAO Questions, etc. 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws_policies/policy/im/1998/im9803a.htm, 
Information Memorandum 98-03, Administration for Children and Families, United 
States Department of Health and Human Services.  
58 United States Department of Health and Human Services, Memorandum, June 4  
1997, 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/laws_policies/policy/im/1997/im9704a1.htm 
59 See section (3) of the Inter-ethnic Placement Act, Public Law 104-88.  The Health 
and Human Services interpretation was not received without a protest from the 
American child welfare community. The Child Welfare League of America objected 
to the colour-blind interpretation of the new of law with to the then Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, stating that “We are in complete disagreement with the 
Department of Health and Human Service’s interpretation of MEPA/IEP as 
effectively disallowing any consideration of race in adoptive and foster care 
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Welfare Act (ICWA).60 The Indian Child Welfare Act was passed in 197861 
As an American federal law; it applies to all of the states within the United 
States. It was passed in response to the forced removal of Indian children from 
their homes, resulting in  
  
“…an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken up by 
the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them.”62  
 
The removal was done in accordance with a philosophy that the forced 
assimilation of Indian children was in their best interest.63 ICWA created 
higher standards for the removal64 and reintegration efforts65 to be made for 
                                                                                                                               
placement decisions. This policy directly contradicts what we know to be best 
practice in child welfare.” This letter is online at: 
http://www.cwla.org/programs/adoption/davidsletter.htm. 
60 The Indian Child Welfare Act was passed in 1978 (Public Law 95-608). As an 
American federal law, it applies to all of the states within the United States.  For 
background and purpose on ICWA explained in recent scholarship, see generally  M 
Corcoran “Rhetoric Versus Reality: The Jurisdiction of Rape, the Indian Child 
Welfare Act, and the Struggle for Tribal Self-Determination” (2009) 15 William and 
Mary Journal of Women and the Law 415, at 428-436; C Metteer Lorillard “Retelling 
the Stories of Indian Families: Judicial Narratives that Determine the Placement of 
Indian Children under the Indian Child Welfare Act” (2009) 8(2) Whittier Journal of 
Child and Family Advocacy 191; P Kunsesh “Borders Beyond Borders—Protecting 
Essential Tribal Relations Off Reservation Under the Indian Child Welfare Act” 
(2007) 42 New England Law Review 15.  
61 Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, as amended, 2000, Public Law 95-608, 25 USC 
1901 et.seq.   
62 25 USC 1901(4).  
63 See, for instance, Child Welfare League of America apology:  
http://theacademy.sdsu.edu/TribalSTAR/resources/files/ApologyCWLA.pdf 
“Between 1958 and 1967, CWLA cooperated with the Bureau of Indian Affairs, 
under a federal contract, to facilitate an experiment in which 395 Indian children were 
removed from their tribes and cultures for adoption by non-Indian families. This 
experiment began primarily in the New England states. CWLA channeled federal 
funds to its oldest and most established private agencies first, to arrange the 
adoptions, though public child welfare agencies were also involved toward the end of 
this period. Exactly 395 adoptions of Indian children were done and studied during 
this 10-year period, with the numbers peaking in 1967.... I deeply regret the fact that 
CWLA”s active participation gave credibility to such a hurtful, biased, and 
disgraceful course of action. I also acknowledge that a CWLA representative testified 
against ICWA at least once, although fortunately, that testimony did not achieve its 
end.” 
64 See 25 USC 1912(d) and (e).  
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Indian children and for the termination of parental rights66, as well as creating 
concurrent jurisdiction with tribal courts67, in those instances where the tribal 
court does not have exclusive jurisdiction.68 There are also provisions for the 
active involvement of the child’s tribe in the state court case.69  Tribal 
preferences for fostering and adoption placements are to be followed70, and 
tribal definitions for who comprises the child’s ‘extended family’71 are also to 
be followed in determination of fostering and adoptive placements.72  
The Indian Child Welfare Act defines an Indian child as a child who 
is either a member of a federally registered tribe or is eligible for 
membership in a federally registered tribe and has a parent that is a 
member of that tribe.73 As the law is written, if a child meets this 
definition, the law is to apply to the child.  
This, however, is not as straightforward as it might seem. Because of 
judicial resistance to the ICWA, there has been confusion and lack of clarity 
as to when and whether courts would apply ICWA even to those children who 
do meet the threshold definition of being covered by the ICWA. Judicial 
resistance to the act resulted in culminated with the creation of the so-called 
‘Existing Indian Family Exception’.74 Judges used this to decide a child who, 
                                                                                                                               
65 Removal requires proof of active efforts made to prevent the removal of the 
children, in contrast to the reasonable efforts that are required by the Adoptions and 
Safe Families Act. Active efforts are held to be a higher standard than reasonable 
efforts. See 25 USC 1912  
66 25 USC 1912 (f).  Requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the need to 
terminate parental rights, with such proof including that of an expert witness. Most 
state  laws require that the case for termination of parental rights be  proven by a clear 
and convincing evidence standard for non-Indian children.  
67 25 USC 1911 (b). This provision requires the transfer of state court proceedings to 
tribal court in the absence of any good cause shown.  
68 25 USC 1911(a).  This provides that “An Indian tribe shall have jurisdiction 
exclusive as to any State over any child custody proceeding involving an Indian child 
who resides or is domiciled within the reservation of such tribe, except where such 
jurisdiction is otherwise vested in the state by existing Federal law. Where an Indian 
child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, 
notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.” 
69 25 USC 1912(a)—regarding notice provisions to the child’s tribe.  
70 25 USC 1915(a) and (b).  
71 25 USC 1915(c).  
72 25 USC 1903(2);  1915(a)  and(b).  
73 25 USC 1903(4). 
74 This judiciary end-run on the application of ICWA was a judicial creation by the 
Kansas Supreme Court in the case of  In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 231 Kan. 199, 
643 P.2d 168 (1982). Kansas finally abolished the doctrine in 2009 See In the Matter 
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although meeting the jurisdictional definitions in ICWA of being an Indian 
child, was not ‘Indian enough’ for an application of ICWA.75 In so doing, 
judges then circumvented the higher standards of ICWA from being utilised 
in child care proceedings.  
 Yet, aside from drawing some attention when the Hague Convention on 
Intercountry adoption was first put into force in the United States in 2008,  
there appears to be little discomfort in the United States about the conflicting 
laws on how to consider issues of race.76 A child could thus be subject to any 
                                                                                                                               
of AJS. March 27, 2009, Supreme Court of the State of Kansas, at 
http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-Opinions/opinions/supct/2009/20090327/99130. 
htm.   The author worked with other legal professionals in the State of Kansas to form 
a strategy to have this doctrine rescinded in Kansas. See comments of Professor A 
Organick, who created a Tribal Legal Clinic at Washburn University School of Law, 
Topeka, Kansas, USA,  “Since I started the Tribal Court Practice Clinic (TCPC) at 
Washburn, I have been in a yearly cycle of reevaluating and reassessing institutional 
and pedagogical goals when lawyering for Indigenous people in a clinical setting. Part 
of the reevaluation process has to do with how Kansas deals with the Indian Child 
Welfare Act (ICWA) and my attempt, along with others, to reframe that debate... Last 
night, I spoke with a good friend and colleague from Kansas, Sarah Sargent. Ms. 
Sargent is an attorney and child advocate and one of the first people I met when I 
moved from New Mexico to Kansas. As it happens, she is also an expert on ICWA 
and the impact of the Existing Indian Family Exception to ICWA on Indian children 
and Indian tribes. She and I have worked together on a number of issues that impact 
children and juveniles in the state of Kansas and ICWA is always on our minds. 
When we spoke last night, we were trying to come up with a strategy for abolishing 
the Existing Indian Family Exception to ICWA in Kansas.... working on ICWA issues 
over the past three years has taken a lot of time.... This particular exception to ICWA 
isn’t an issue here in New Mexico. And so, when I realized how important an issue 
this was, I became involved in work across the state to try and educate lawyers, social 
workers and judges about ICWA and about why the EIFE should be abolished in 
Kansas.” A Organick in “Indian Law Clinics and Externship Symposium Roundtable 
Discussion: Lawyering for Indigenous People” (2007) 8 Tribal Law Journal 52 at 57, 
59.  
75 See Baby Boy L n 74 above.  See also D Lewerenz and P McCoy “The End of the 
“Existing Indian Family”Jurisprudence: Holyfield at 20, In the Matter of AJS and the 
Last Gasps of a Dying Doctrine”(2010) 36 William Mitchell Law Review 684; CL 
Jaffke “The “Existing Indian Family” Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act: The 
States” Attempt to Slaughter Tribal Interests in Children”(2006) 66 Louisiana Law 
Review 733; B Atwood “The Voice of the Indian Child: Strengthening the Indian 
Child Welfare Act Through Children”s Participation”(2008) 50 Arizona Law Review 
127; B Atwood “Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Understanding 
State Resistance (2002) 51 Emory Law Journal 587. 
76 A notable exception is the research done by the Evan B Donaldson Foundation n 51 
above. “Another exception is an article written in 1999, well before the United States 
law on intercountry adoption came into force—see C Metteer “A Law Unto Itself: 
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one of the four laws with their differing and even conflicting approaches to 
considerations of race and culture, dependent upon the circumstances of their 
adoption. A child adopted from the United States child care system to another 
country is potentially subject to both MEPA-IEP and the IAA.   Implementing 
regulations of the IAA require that ‘prospective parents receive training 
related to transracial adoption, as well as counseling related to the child’s 
cultural, racial, religious, ethnic, and linguistic background.’77A comparison 
with the strictures of MEPA-IEP quickly identifies the conflicting content of 
the two laws. It is just this sort of activity that is forbidden by MEPA-IEP.  
Yet this goes without much comment, let alone redress. Perhaps because the 
conflict is not seen as limiting adoptive parent access to children of their 
choosing, there is little outcry about the irreconcilable differences in the 
content of these two laws.  
The justification for transracial adoption—that is of black children into 
white families—is that there are large numbers of children who would never 
be adopted otherwise. This much is true. The United States has a large 
population of children legally freed for adoption and awaiting adoptive 
homes. 78 And in sheer numbers, the children who need to be adopted are 
white.79 There are no shortages of white children available for adoption. It is 
not only that there are not enough adoptive families for black children—there 
are not enough adoptive families for white children. There are not enough 
adoptive families for the children who are in the system.  
Yet a myth is persists that there are no white children available for 
adoption in the United States. This simply is not true. This myth is used to 
justify the choice of intercountry adoption—that there are no white children in 
the United States that are available for adoption. The truth is that there are 
                                                                                                                               
The Indian Child Welfare Act as Inapplicable and Inappropriate to the 
Transracial/Race-Matching Adoption Controversy” (1999) 38 Brandeis Law Journal 
48. For a view in opposition to that of the Evan B Donaldson Foundation report, see C 
Mabry “A MEPA-IEP review from Adoption Attorneys” Perspectives: Continuing to 
Make Permissible Assessments Based on Race for the Best Interests of Children of 
Color” (2009) 38 Capital University Law Review 319.  
77 Evan B Donaldson Report n 51 above, Executive Summary at 4.  
78 Data from the  Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and Reporting System 
(hereinafter “AFCARS”)  Administration for Families and Children, U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services, shows 64,084 children had their parental rights 
terminated, with 107, 011 children who either had a goal of adoption or parental 
rights terminated. Data is from “Preliminary FY 2010 Estimates as of June 2011”, at 
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_research/afcars/tar/report_18.  
79 Ibid , showing that 39 per cent, or 42,059 children with a goal of adoption and/or 
whose parental rights have been terminated are white.  
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white children—but not children that prospective adopters find palatable.80 
They are somehow damaged goods—and rejected by prospective adopters 
who turn to intercountry adoption. 81 
 
ENGLISH LAWS ON TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION:  
 
This article uses the extensive discussion regarding the American 
transracial adoption legal discourse as a mirror for considering the recent 
adoption policy changes announced in England in 2011. Of course the 
American and the English historical and social experiences of the issue of race 
are very different. Some might argue that this limits the ability to productively 
use one to study the other. But this article can do what the two respective legal 
systems cannot do themselves—draw conclusions on similarities in the legal 
discourse as well as differences, yet ponder on the failure of either a colour 
conscious or colour blind approach to deal with the issue of large numbers of 
ethnic minority children in care awaiting adoption from state care systems. 
This after all, must be the ultimate issue, the children awaiting adoption. But 
the question on these children is not so simple as the need to locate sufficient 
numbers of adoptive parents of any colour or race. The underlying question is 
why these children are in the child care system in such numbers in the first 
place.  
In contrast to the United States, England has a uniform approach to its 
adoption laws, and does not have separate standards for adoptions that are 
domestic or international, or through an independent rather than government 
funded agency. There are no separate laws for a particular ethnic classification 
or heritage.  
Section 1(5) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002 requires that an 
adoption agency give ‘due consideration to the child’s religious persuasion, 
                                                     
80 A Ortiz and L Briggs “The Culture of Poverty, Crack Babies, and Welfare Cheats” 
(2003) 21 (3) Social Text 39. They compare the profile of children that were available 
for adoption from the United States care system and those that were adopted 
internationally into the United States from Romania, finding very little difference in 
the profile of the child, and questioning when then adopters made the choice to adopt 
from Romania: “By virtually any measure—age at adoption, aggressiveness towards 
peers and family, trouble getting along with other children, school problems, 
delinquency—these two groups of children offered the same ( considerable) 
behavioural and emotional challenges to their adoptive families....Finding these 
children so similar in so many dimensions raises a question: why did American rush 
to Romania...to adopt deeply troubled kids at considerable expensive to themselves 
and with very little formal support for raising them, when they could have adopted 
substantially similar children in the United States, with institutionalized  support and 
government subsidy?” at 39.   
81 See generally ibid. 
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racial origin and cultural and linguistic background’82 Further guidance on 
this is given in the 2003 ‘Adoption: National Minimum Standards’ from the 
Department of Health:  
 
2.2 Children are matched with adopters who best meet their assessed 
needs. Wherever possible this will be with a family which: 
 
a. reflects their ethnic origin, cultural background, religion and 
language; and 
b. allows them to live with brothers and sisters unless this will not 
meet their individually assessed needs. 
 
Where the child cannot be matched with a family which reflects their 
ethnic origin, cultural background, religion and language, the 
adoption agency makes every effort to find an alternative suitable 
family within a realistic timescale to ensure the child is not left 
waiting indefinitely in the care system. Where children cannot live 
with a family asset out in (a) and (b) above, a clear explanation will be 
given to them, having regard to their age and understanding, and be 
recorded.83 
 
Ethnic matching is permitted and in fact encouraged. It is seen as 
preferable to transracial placement. Even so, it is not permissible to delay in 
adoption for a child whilst a search is made for a matching family. Children 
are not to be left without any family at all, lingering in care whilst the 
hypothetical ideal match of a same race family is pursued. However, in the 
face of system criticism that transracial adoptions were not being permitted, 
further guidance was issued. The new Guidance makes clear that it is not 
acceptable to delay placement with a prospective adopter on the basis that the 
placement would be transracial:  
 
“If the prospective adopter can meet most of the child’s needs, the 
social worker must not delay placing the child with the prospective 
adopter because they are single, older than other adopters or does not 
share the child’s racial or cultural background.”84   
                                                     
82 S 1(5) Adoption and Children Act 2002. Emphasis added.  
83 “Adoption: National Minimum Standards (2003) Department of Health, Standard 
2.2, p 11. Emphasis added.  
84  Adoption Statutory Guidance: The Adoption and Children Act 2002, Department 
for Education, p 83, paragraph 4 (updated April 19, 2011) at 
http://www.education.gov.uk/b0072314/guidance/ch4/match (References are made to 
the online version of the Guidance).  
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Delay presumably would occur if the search was made for a perceived 
racial or cultural match whilst another adoptive home that was not a racial or 
cultural match for the child was available.  
As well, denying a placement on the basis that it would be transracial is 
not permitted:  
 
“Any practice that classifies couples/single people in a way that 
effectively rules out adoption because of their status, age, or because 
they and the child do not share the same racial or cultural background 
is not child centred and is not acceptable.” 85 
 
The Guidance goes on to address the way in which social workers 
identified the ethnic heritage of a child, arguing against a simplistic black or 
white categorisation:  
 
“The structure of white, black and minority ethnic groups is often 
complex and their heritage diverse, where the race, religion, language 
and culture of each community has varying degrees of importance in 
the daily lives of individuals. It is important that social workers avoid 
‘labelling’ a child and ignoring some elements in their background, or 
placing the child’s ethnicity above all else when looking for an 
adoptive family for the child.”86 
 
The effort to de-emphasise ethnicity and culture as part of the adoption 
matching process is reflected in the new content of the ‘Adoption: National 
Minimum Standards’ issued in April 2011 by the Department for Education.87 
The language of the standard 2.2 in the 2003 version is conspicuously absent 
from any of the adoption standards in the latest version of the adoption 
standards. 
A colour conscious approach such as that outlined in the statute and 
underscored by the new Guidance arguably requires a deeper understanding of 
social connection and construction around issues of race than the more 
simplistic colour-blind approach.  But research from the Adoption Research 
Initiative found placement decisions were made which did not show an 
informed view about ethnicity.88 The way in which the confusion is portrayed 
                                                     
85 Ibid;  p 83, para 5. http://www.education.gov.uk/b0072314/guidance/ch4/match. 
86 Ibid , p 84 para 6.  
http://www.education.gov.uk/b0072314/guidance/ch4/match/ethnicity-and-culture 
87 Adoption: National Minimum Standards (2011) Department for Health.  
88 “Summary 6: Pathways to permanence for black, Asian and mixed ethnicity 
children (November 2010) Adoption Research Initiatives, at 
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suggests that there is a polarisation of white and non-white identities—rather 
than identities that are inclusive:  
 
“Their social workers were often uncertain about whether they should 
be placing the child to preserve his or her present identity or to enable 
the development of another ethnic identity to which the child had a 
genetic connection.”89 
 
There is also evidence of reluctance to place children transracially, with 
courts acting to over-ride social worker reluctance to place a child in a 
transracial or multiracial placement: 
 
“Requests by foster carers (usually white English) to adopt minority 
ethnic children were often a source of professional dispute. There 
were often conflicting views, expressed in Courts, about whether or 
not it would be in the child’s best interests to be moved to an 
ethnically matched placement. In all of such cases in the sample, the 
judgement went in favour of the foster carer.”90  
 
Thus, whilst the United States’ MEPA law was initially very close to the 
English law, the legal positions on how to make placement decisions in 
transracial adoption diverged following the IEP amendment in 1996. 
Consequently, the English legal position and the American legal position on 
domestic adoptions from the child care system are very different. One is now 
colour-blind, the other colour-conscious. But there are indications of the 
English system drifting towards an American colour-blind approach. The 
most recent English statutory guidance iteration is more remarkable for what 
it does not say than what it does say. Whilst the English legal position on 
transracial adoption remains a long way from the strictly colour-blind position 
of the American federal MEPA-IEP law, this omission of language should not 
go without comment.  
The English child welfare system does not have the same type of 
statistical data as is compiled by the United States federal government. For the 
first time, however, in March 201191, a comprehensive ‘datapack’92 was 
                                                                                                                               
www.adoptionresearchinitiative.org.uk/summaries/ARi_summary_6.pdf. See also J 
Selwyn, D Quinton, P Harris, D Wijedasa, S Nawaz, and M Wood  Pathways to 
Permanence for Black, Asian and Mixed Ethnicity Children (BAAF, 2010). 
89 Summary 6 n 49 above at 3. 
90 Ibid at 4.  
91 Adoption and Special Guardianship England Data Pack, Department for Education, 
March 2011. 
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released, with some revealing information about the operation on the adoption 
over several years. Comments from the data pack reveal that there are black 
children (which the report clarifies are not ethnically mixed93) who wait 
longer for adoption than children of other ethnicities.94  It is difficult to draw 
statistical comparisons between the United States and England based on this 
disparate set of data, but one commonality is clear: there are large numbers of 
black children awaiting adoptive homes in both systems and that each system 
has concluded that transracial adoption is the way to provide a solution for the 
black children awaiting adoption. 
 
THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF COLOUR-
BLINDNESS  
 
One description of colour-blindness is that it ‘becomes an alluring 
personal strategy to subvert racism to not see racialized differences, 
normalizing all persons through seeing people as people’ 95 On the other hand, 
use of a colour-blind approach allows racism to exist without challenge.96 If 
race is not seen, racism is more difficult to challenge, as its very existence is 
denied in a colour-blind approach.97  If race is not seen, racism is not 
challenged, and the social inequities that are part of a racialised society go 
without challenge.  A colour-blind approach to adoption placement allows a 
system to avoid a discussion on the deep seated racism that is part of the 
larger society as well as in the adoption system.98 
Transracial adoption contains an element of not only rendering invisible 
the black mother, but the ‘devaluing of Black mothers’99—a widespread 
                                                                                                                               
http://www.education.gov.uk/childrenandyoungpeople/families/adoption/a0076713/da
tapack 
92 Ibid.  
93 Ibid, stating that “The data indicate that longer placement times are especially 
apparent for: black children (not mixed ethnicity)”, at Slide 14.  
94 Ibid, at Slide 14. There are some  self-acknowledged deficiencies in the data, with 
the comment offered that “It is not known how many children with an adoption 
recommendation are never placed for adoption.” Ibid, at Slide 14.  
95 G Samuels “Being Raised Among White People: Navigating Racial Difference 
Among Adopted Multiracial Adults” (2009) 71 Journal of Marriage and Family 80, 
92. Emphasis in the original.  
96 M Harris and W Hackett “Decisions Points in Child Welfare: An Action Research 
Model to Address Disproportionality” (2008) 30 Children and Youth Services Review 
199, 204. 
97 Ibid at 204.  
98 Ibid. 
99 D Roberts “Unshackling Black Motherhood” (1997) 95 Michigan Law Review 938 
at 938.  
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‘legacy’100 in the way that the United States society has constructed Black 
motherhood.101  
Citing the work of Dorothy Roberts, Briggs comments that: 
 
“...invidious, if often unconscious, bias permeates the child protective 
system. Similarly situated children and birth parents are treated very 
differently...at every level of the system. Black parents are presented 
with impossible reunification plans, accused of things they did not do, 
and denied access to their children.”102 
 
A comment from scholar R-A Howe effectively unmasks the truth, 
unpalatable though it might be, about the role and effects of colour-blind 
transracial adoption:  
 
“From my perspective, the transracial adoption debate is about 
establishing a new right or entitlement for certain white adults who 
wish to become parents by any means they select. Proponents of 
transracial adoption who claim that same-race placement preferences 
are victimizing the increasing numbers of Black children in foster care 
are employing a diversionary “smokescreen” strategy. This 
smokescreen obfuscates important systemic problems and creates 
additional barriers to meeting the needs of Black children, Black 
families and the Black community. The focus of attention should be 
shifted away from the illusory debate about the merits of transracial 
adoption to the real issue: whether it is appropriate to establish new 
rights for adults seeking to adopt children.”103 
 
Colour-blindness not only makes racism invisible, but has the effect of 
erasing non-white parts of society from any recognised existence in adoption 
policies, according to comments in research by Perry.  In her seminal article, 
Perry observes the damage that is done through the use of colour-blind 
adoption policies. In so doing she describes the social function served by 
colour-blind policies. She argues that a colour-blind approach simply acts to 
reinforce social hierarchies of race:  
 
                                                     
100 Ibid at  938. 
101 Ibid.  
102 Briggs n 1 above at 435.  
103 Howe n 2 above at 138-139.  
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“...While rendering the Black community invisible, the discourse of 
colorblind individualism also reinforces the subordination of Black 
communities. ...”104  
 
Some commentators see the reality of why ethnic minority children are 
present in such high percentages in the child welfare system as due simply 
ever-present racism--spoken or unspoken, acknowledged or justified—in 
larger society. Women and families who do not fit the image of an idealised 
family structure are at risk of having their children put into care for that 
reason alone.  Wing and Weselmann comment that:  
 
“...Mothers are presumed to be white and are discriminated against if 
they demonstrate that they are raced.”105 
 
Thus, the racial element of reasons that children of colour end up in the 
state child care system may in fact be the driving factor for child placement—
as distasteful and even controversial as this may be. 106 
Transracial adoption is thus a tangled web of interest and power. It is not a 
child centred practice that is focused about providing what is best for children. 
It is adult centred, with the desires and motivations of those adults that make 
up a privileged part of society insisting on their right to have unimpeded 
access to the children of their choice:  
 
“...the transracial adoption controversy is not about addressing the 
needs of the many older Black children who enter the foster care 
system; rather it is about giving preferences to certain white adults 
who seek to adopt infants.”107 
 
                                                     
104 Perry n 3 above at 80-81.Emphasis added.  
105 A  Wing and L Weselmann  “Transcending Traditional Notions of Mothering: The 
Need for Critical Race Praxis”(1999) 3 Journal of Gender,  Race and Justice 257 at  
268, 269, 271 
106 Briggs sounds a similar note in her research, arguing that the wrong questions are 
being asked about child welfare and transracial adoption. She states that “...I would 
argue the questions we need to be asking are, why are children of color being taken 
from their families in such numbers and why are they so much less likely than white 
children to be reunited?....Similarly situated children and birth parents are treated very 
differently....at every level of the system. Black parents are presented with impossible 
reunification plans, accused of things they did not do, and denied access to their 
children.” Briggs, n 1 above at 435.  
107 Howe n 2 above at 149.  Emphasis in the original.  
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Scholars have recently begun to explore the current relationship between 
race and the law. The election of Barack Obama to the US Presidency was 
hailed by some as evidence of a ‘post-racial’108 era in the United States.109 But 
this is in fact not the situation at all. Rather, the legal system is just as active 
in maintaining the social expectations about the balance of power in American 
society as it was before the civil rights movement. Haney Lopez comments  
that current laws represent ‘a backlash to civil rights’.110 Shani King’s 
research supports this, and points out that the passage of MEPA-IEP—the so-
called colour-blind approach to transracial adoption-was part of this backlash 
against the civil rights movement.111 
S King points to the importance of ‘challenging...the colorblind 
perspective’112 of American family law.113 
 
“Challenging the [American family law] canon will highlight its 
colorblind perspective and reveal the extent to which precedent allows 
color consciousness in family law, whether it is a situation in which 
not acknowledging the role of race in family law perpetuates racial 
inequality, or it is a situation in which not acknowledging the role of 
                                                     
108 I Haney Lopez, “Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration 
in the Age of Obama” (2010) 101 California Law Review 102;  S King, The Family 
Law Canon in a (Post?) Racial Era (2011) 72(3) Ohio State Law Journal 575, 577. 
109 Haney Lopez n 108 above at 102-103;  S King n 108 above at 577-578. 
110 Haney Lopez  n 108 above at 109. Haney Lopez’s article is focused on the large 
numbers of African-Americans who have been incarcerated after the Civil Rights 
movement. The group Human Rights Watch has also examined this situation, pointing 
out the “racial disparities in prison admissions for drug offences.” Human Rights 
Watch , “Targeting Blacks: Drug Law Enforcement and Race in the United States” 
(2008) at 41. The report comments that “In absolute numbers, there are far more 
whites committing drug offences  than blacks.  The disproportionate rates at which 
blacks are sent to prison for drug offences compared to whites largely originate in 
racially disproportionate rates of arrest for drug offenses.” at 41. This systemic 
disproportionality is reflective of the American child welfare racial disparities.  
111 S King n 108 above at 623.  This is a view that is outlined by D Roberts  n 99  
above , who comments about the revelations made by her own research: “When 
stories about the prosecutions of women for using drugs during pregnancy first 
appeared in newspapers in 1989, I immediately suspected that most of the defendants 
were Black women. Charging someone with a crime for giving birth to a baby seemed 
to fit into the legacy of devaluing Black mothers. I was so sure about this intuition 
that I embarked on my first major law review article based on the premise that the 
prosecutions perpetuated  Black women’s subordination. My hunch turned out to be 
right...” at 938.  
112 S King n 108 above at 640.  
113 Ibid at 640  
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race means not fully considering the best interests of the child. 
Challenging the canon will call attention to the ways in which race is 
still a significant factor in society, in how people arrange their private 
lives and families, and in the law that governs these families.”114 
 
From his viewpoint, colour-blindness in the law should not go 
uncontested. Its presence should be acknowledged, and the way in which 
colour-blindness enables the continuance of racial inequities in society—and 
serves to mask them—must be brought to the fore. Failing to confront this—
the continuing silence of the role that colour-blind laws play in racial inequity 
is tantamount itself to ‘promot[ing] racial inequality.’115 
Research by Ortiz and Briggs also supports the assertions that the United 
States federal MEPA-IEP law was part of the larger backlash that occurred in 
the wake of the American Civil Rights movement: 
 
“The 1997 legislation [IEP] prohibiting race matching in adoption was 
part of this structure masking the racial bad faith of neoconservatives 
and neoliberal colorblindness, a multiculturalism accompanied by the 
gutting of affirmative action in employment and education and the 
dismantling of the federal safety net for poor women and children 
embodied in AFDC. Perhaps more than at any time in the three 
decades of arguments about childhood that preceded it, the Adoption 
Promotion Act did not attempt to hide the contempt that was 
embedded in its pity of the poor.” 116 
 
Ortiz and Briggs also argue that the fixation on poverty and the poor was 
simply another mask for racial bias in laws—where the term ‘welfare 
mothers’117 came to mean ‘black, Latino, Native American, and less, often, 
Asian Women and their children’. 118 
The 2010 Adoption Research Institute study on ethnic minority children 
adoption  comments on the lack of information about the experiences of 
minority ethnic children in England:  
 
                                                     
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid.  
116 Ortiz and Briggs n 80 above  at 51.  For a view that the development of adoption 
in control was a form of exercising control over poor women and children, see J 
Reeves “The Deviant Mother and Child: The Development of Adoption as an 
Instrument of Social Control” (1993) 20 (4) Journal of Law and Society 412.  
117 Ibid at 50.  
118 Ibid.  
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“There is a shortage of data on looked after minority ethnic children, 
when and why they come into care, how decisions are made about 
their futures and what happens to them in their care careers. There 
have been debates about best practice in placement of minority ethnic 
children and this remains an area of mixed opinions.”119 
 
A similar observation was made in 1999 about the United States child care 
system:   
 
“...more information is needed about the policies and practices that 
bring children of color into the system, as well as about the effect on 
all children of child welfare policies and practice.  A better 
understanding of these issues is crucial to the discussion surrounding 
racial matching.”120  
 
It would seem that very little progress has been made.  
 
‘TRAPPED IN LEGAL DISCOURSE’ 
 
The messages about what is beneficial to children, about the meanings of 
race, culture and transracial placements all are re-interpreted by law, and 
become trapped in legal discourse.121 Contrary to what many would argue, 
transracial adoption is not at the cutting edge of social egalitarianism—far 
from it. Instead it is an exercise of societally bestowed privilege and power—
or the lack of it:  
 
“Changes in the letter of law which appear to favour certain social 
groups may also reinforce a particular image of members of that 
group. ...in modern pluralist societies where social realities tend to be 
fiercely contested, it is hardly surprising that the formal legal system, 
with its vested interested in maintaining its own credibility and 
reproductive capabilities, should be so resistant to the rapid 
acceptance of new versions of reality.”122 
 
                                                     
119 Ibid at 1.  
120 D Brooks, R Barth, A Bussiere, and G Patterson “Adoption and Race: 
Implementing the Multiethnic Placement Act and the Interethnic Adoption Provisions 
(1999) 44(2) Social Work 167 at 176-177.  
121 See generally Smith n 20 above;  M King (1991) n 20 above, M King (1994) n 19 
above.  
122 M King (1993) n 19 at 232.  
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
 
159 
Colour-blind or colour-conscious, transracial adoption law and practices 
only act to reinforce existing stereotypes and prejudices and racially based 
social hierarchy. The utilisation of transracial laws, informed by social and 
policy agendas, has resulted in simply maintenance of the social status quo.  
From the view of the autopoietic theory lens, this would come as no surprise. 
King argues that ‘law frees us from the demand we should learn from 
experience.’123 In this consideration of law, law as a system of communication 
cannot learn from its past experiences or from the experiences of other 
system. All law can do is fulfil its function which is to ‘stabilize[] congruent 
expectations and in so doing, provide[] certainty’.124  
In respect to transracial adoption then, law as a system cannot ‘learn’ from 
the experiences of other systems nor take on board historical value from past 
attempts to address transracial adoption. It simply manages expectations 
around transracial adoptive placement—and that is by –in both the United 
States and the United Kingdom—assuring that there is no legal barrier for 
white parents having ethnic minority children place with them for adoption—
whether or not this is actually occurring and whether or not white adoptive 
parents are seeking out these sorts of children to adopt.  
King’s critique of child welfare in law through an autopoietic lens 
provides insights into how child welfare information becomes ‘trap[ped] 
within legal discourse’.125 Commenting upon the changes in family courts in 
England, he argues against any idea that child welfare and law can combine to 
provide solutions: 
 
“…that those who wish to promote those developments as precursors 
of the family court ideal—with welfare and justice going hand-in-
hand as equal partners ready to solve any problems and resolve any 
conflict involving children’s interests are deceiving themselves and 
those who believe in them..a genuine partnership cannot exist, for any 
attempt to merge child-welfare science with law as part of the legal 
system will inevitably result in the domination of law and the 
‘enslavement’ of child-welfare knowledge to serve institutional 
objectives.”126  
 
He further argues that attempts to merge knowledge from two different 
systems simply will not happen due to the autopoietic nature of systems.127  
Knowledge shared across and between systems is not given the same meaning 
                                                     
123  M King (1991) n 20 above at 305.  
124 Ibid at 305. 
125 Ibid at 319.  
126 Ibid at 319.  
127 Ibid at 318. 
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as within those systems. King draws a pessimistic prediction about the ability 
of courts to adequately include ‘parents and social services’128 as part of a 
partnership with the court to formulate outcomes that operate in the interests 
of children.129  
Smith likewise draws the conclusion that law is not able to absorb social 
scientific thinking. Rather, she argues, in the same vein as King, that law 
simply reinvents the social scientific meanings fed into it in such a way that 
those meanings are diluted and distorted to achieve an outcome that is 
compatible with legal system outcomes.130 She explains in relation to post-
adoption contact that: 
 
“[r]ather than integrating social scientific knowledge into its 
operations, law has avoided this epistemic entrapment by identifying 
contact arrangements and children’s well-being as the (legal) 
responsibility of adoptive parents. It is problematic for law to import 
social scientific communications when its thinking is characterized by 
an exclusive focus on the legal consequences of adoption.”131  
 
Neither King nor Smith see legal systems as being able to incorporate 
meaning imported from social welfare or child welfare systems in the ways 
that are intended to benefit children and families. That attempts to reform 
legal institutions seem to never meet up to expectations would not be a 
surprise to an autopoietic researcher.  
 What then are the observations that can be made through an autopoietic 
lens about transracial adoption? If the function of a colour-blind discourse is 
the continued subordination of ethnic minority communities, then the legal 
system will not act to alter that expectation and outcome. However positioned 
within child welfare, transracial adoption discourse changes its meaning when 
it is imported into the legal system. King points out that ‘law as a discourse is 
not interested in consequences, but in maintaining expectations that certain 
consequences will occur...’132 Law then is not concerned with whether 
transracial adoption actually increases as a result of law or policy changes, nor 
yet whether those placements operate for or against the interest of children. 
Rather, law seeks to not fall short of meeting expectations, and where the 
expectation of transracial adoption in legal discourse is to maintain racially 
hierarchical social strata, law is not troubled in the least. The tools for seeking 
change in the child welfare system lose their potency when transferred to legal 
                                                     
128 Ibid at 319 
129 Ibid at 319-320.  
130 Ibid at 309.  
131 Smith n 21 above at 337.  
132 M King (1991) n 21 above at 309.  
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systems—and account for the lack of progress in resolving racial disparity of 
ethnic minority children in child welfare systems. The tools for change simply 
have become trapped within legal discourse. Until or unless that can be 
recognised and unravelled, it will make no difference to the outcomes whether 
the law takes a colour-blind or colour-conscious approach.  
  
CONCLUSION  
 
This article has compared the differing approaches to transracial adoption 
in the United States and England. It has focused on the laws that govern 
adoption from state child care systems. The US has multiple laws that govern 
adoption and the content of these conflicts as to whether and how to consider 
issues of race, culture and ethnicity when making adoption decisions for 
children. The law that governs adoption from the state child care system 
moved from a colour-conscious to a colour-blind system, where it is forbidden 
to give consideration to race, colour or national origin except in very limited 
and exception circumstances. The impetus for this change was the belief that 
transracial placements of ethnic minority children to white adoptive parents 
were not being made. In the same vein, England has announced a change to its 
adoption policies, underscoring that its laws do not ban transracial 
placements. Whilst it is required to give consideration to issues of culture and 
ethnicity in English law, transracial adoptions have not in fact been banned in 
the law. Instead, social workers interpreted the law in ways that made it seem 
as if transracial placements were not being made—based in part upon social 
worker’s own individual interpretations of laws, of ethnic heritage and what 
they felt was best for a child. The furore over transracial adoption in both 
countries has been characterised as an issue over whether white adoptive 
parents were being denied the child of their choosing—with some 
commentators suggesting that the children of interest are infants, not older 
ethnic minority children. This being the case, transracial adoption is simply an 
exercise of and reflection of existent racially based social hierarchies. Far 
from transforming inequities in society, when reinterpreted by legal systems, 
transracial adoption policies simply maintain a status quo. Autopoietic theory 
argues that nothing more can or should be expected from child welfare 
meanings being introduced into legal systems. Rather, law simply absorbs 
these and re-interprets them in ways congruent with the legal system and its 
function of maintaining expectations—causing the meanings to become 
‘trap[ped].. within the legal discourse.’133 
Thus, to beg the question then of ‘how’ to affect change and free children 
from the trap of legal discourse, a few final thoughts and comments are 
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offered. Shani King comments on the entrenched social views that Americans 
have on the structure of their society and the role that colour-blind views have 
played in forming and maintaining that view:  
 
“Partly through colorblindness and partly through the accumulate 
weight of cultural beliefs and historical practices, most Americans 
accept that major American institutions are race-neutral and that these 
institutions produce vast racial disparities. If this is so, then simply 
informing whites about dramatic race-correlated differences will not 
challenge, let alon[e] change their beliefs, because they already 
recognize and accept such inequalities as a legitimate feature of social 
reality. Indeed, with racial injustice seemingly a natural condition, an 
emphasis on numbers alone will tend to solidify rather than destabilize 
dominant understandings of society’s basic fairness.”134 
 
It is clear that a colour-blind approach is a part of the problem, and 
certainly no part of the solution in addressing the social situations that have 
resulted in the large numbers of ethnic minority children awaiting –futilely in 
most cases—adoption.  Haney Lopez calls for an outright rejection of colour-
blindness and of undertaking a process instead which can begin to invite the 
sort of social changes that is needed to combat the situation that has resulted 
in the over-representation of ethnic minority children in the state child care 
system.135 He calls for the development of a ‘countervailing narrative about 
race as a form of social stratification.’136 
But, accepting the autopoietic view that legal systems mirror social 
expectations and that they themselves are not sites of change, a counter-
narrative is not going to be enough to affect the sort of change that Haney 
Lopez calls for.  It is a place to start—but that narrative is not going to 
displace the well-entrenched social stratification that permeates American 
society. The narrative must eventually change social mores and messages and 
expectations. Then and only then will the legal system respond in such a way 
that it does not result in racial hierarchy. What direction the English legal 
system goes through its role in maintaining and reflecting social 
expectation—whether it continues a drift towards colour-blindness or retains 
its colour-conscious qualities with all that each positions entails-- remains to 
be seen.  
                                                     
134 Haney Lopez n 108 above at 142.  
135 Ibid at 143.  
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